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l. JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Legacy Litigation: Claims for "Additional Remediation" 
In State v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., the State of Louisi­
ana and the Vermilion Parish School Board sued several defendants, 
seeking remediation and a money judgment for contamination alleg­
edly caused by the defendants' oil and gas activities.1 Such "legacy 
litigation" is governed in part by Louisiana Revised Statute 30:29, 
which provides that, if a defendant is found liable for contamination, 
the Department of Natural Resources must propose a remediation 
plan, and the court must approve either that plan or some other plan 
that a party proves is more feasible. Any damages awarded to fund 
the plan are paid into the registry of the court.2 
The defendants sought a summary judgment because the plaintiffs 
were not entitled to a money judgment exceeding what was necessary 
to fund the approved plan.3 The defendants noted that 30:29(D) re­
quires the entirety of the damages award to be placed into the registry 
of the court, except as provided by 30:29(H).4 In turn, Subsection (H) 
states in part: 
This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a 
judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suf­
fered as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise pro­
vided in this Section. Nor shall it preclude a judgment ordering 
damages for or implementation of additional remediation in excess 
of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to 
this Section as may be required in accordance with the terms of an 
express contractual provision. Any award granted in connection with 
the judgment for additional remediation is not required to be paid 
into the registry of the court.5 
The defendants argued that Subsection (H) barred a money judgment 
for "remediation in excess of ... the plan" because no contract ex­
pressly authorized additional cleanup in this case.6 A majority of the 
1. State v. La. Land and Exploration Co. 2012-0884 (La 1/30/13)· 110 So. 3d 1038. ' . ' 
2. Id. at 1049. 
3. Id. at 1040-41. 
4. Id. at 1064. 
5. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.29(H) (2013) (emphasis added). 
6. Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1053. 
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Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Louisiana Revised 
Statute 30:29 is procedural, not substantive.7 
The Court's logic seemed to be that, if the Court interpreted the 
statute as limiting damages to the amount needed to fund the ap­
proved plan, that would change substantive rights, at least in those 
cases in which a plaintiff otherwise would have been entitled to a 
cleanup in excess of regulatory standards, because such an interpreta­
tion of the statute would entirely take away any remedy for a portion 
of the plaintiffs' injury. In contrast, to the extent that the statute pro­
vides that the portion of a money judgment needed to fund the ap­
proved plan must be put into the registry of the court and then used to 
fund a cleanup, the statute merely specifies that the particular remedy 
awarded for a particular portion of the plaintiffs' injury will be an ac­
tual cleanup, rather than a payment of the amount of money that 
would be needed to fund such a cleanup. 
B. Lease Royalty Disputes 
1. When is Royalty Due 
In Slattery Co. Inc. v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, the plaintiff, Slat­
tery Co. ("Slattery"), owned land in Caddo Parish that was subject to 
a mineral lease held by Chesapeake. 8 Chesapeake completed two 
wells on the leased premises in early 2011.9 Chesapeake began sales 
from one of the wells in January 2011 and began sales from the other 
well in February 2011.10 Slattery and Chesapeake exchanged emails 
regarding when Chesapeake intended to start paying royalties on pro­
duction from the two wells, but as of April 2011, Chesapeake had not 
paid such royalties.11 
On April 13, 2011, Slattery made a written demand on Chesapeake 
for the payment of royalties from the two wells.12 Within thirty days of 
receiving the letter, Chesapeake responded to Slattery in writing, stat­
ing in part: "We are setting up your royalty interest in our system 
.. . " Chesapeake began paying royalties on production from the first 
well on June 29, 2011, and began paying royalties on production from 
the second well on September 29, 2011.13 
Slattery brought suit, and subsequently sought a summary judgment 
that it was entitled to relief that included double damages, attorney's 
fees, and interest.14 Although Chesapeake did not make royalty pay-
7. Id. 
8. Slattery Co. v. Chesapeake La. LP, No. ll-CV-1399, 2013 WL 1152718 (W.D. 
La. Mar. 19, 2013). 




13. Id. at *2. 
14. Id. at *1. 
106 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1 
ments within thirty days of receiving Slattery's written demand, the 
court denied Slattery's motion for summary judgment.15 The court 
noted that " [a] necessary precondition for the award of damages is a 
finding that the mineral royalties were actually 'due."'16 Louisiana 
Mineral Code Article 123 provides that a mineral lessee must make 
timely payments "according to the terms of the contract or the custom 
of the mining industry in question."17 Because the lease at issue did 
not specify when payment of royalties was due, such payments were 
due in accordance with industry custom.18 The court concluded that 
there was an issue of disputed fact regarding whether, under industry 
custom, royalties were due at the time Slattery made its written 
demand.19 
Finally, Slattery argued that Chesapeake's reliance on industry cus­
tom was an affirmative defense that was waived because it was not 
properly pleaded.20 The court rejected that argument, concluding that 
it was part of plaintiff's burden to prove that royalties were already 
due when the plaintiff made written demand for payment.21 Accord­
ingly, the court denied Slattery's motion for summary judgment.22 
2. Whether Pre-Suit Notice of Royalty Claim Can be Given on 
Behalf of Putative Class 
In Williams v. Chesapeake Louisiana, Inc., the plaintiffs brought a 
putative class action, asserting claims based on the alleged underpay­
ment of royalties.23 Chesapeake filed a motion seeking a denial of cer­
tification on grounds that Mineral Code Article 137 requires a lessor 
to give the lessee thirty-days' notice before bringing a claim for non­
payment of royalties.24 Here, the plaintiffs who brought the putative 
class action had purported to give the Article 137 notice on behalf of a 
class of lessors. 25 Chesapeake asserted that each lessor must give the 
notice, and that a person cannot give notice on behalf of a proposed 
class of lessors who have not themselves given notice.26 
Following prior precedent, the court held that, under Louisiana law, 
each individual lessor had to give notice, and that notice cannot be 
given on behalf of a proposed class.27 The court also rejected the 
15. Id. at *1. 




20. Id. at *4 n.3. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at *1. 
23. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 951251 (W.D. La. 
Mar. 11). 
24. Id. at *1. 
25. Id. at *2. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at *4. 
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plaintiffs' argument that, because the plaintiffs sought only monetary 
damages and not lease dissolution, the notice requirement did not 
apply.2s 
The court also examined whether U.S. Supreme Court jurispru­
dence makes Article 137's notice requirement inapplicable in federal 
actions.29 The district court noted that, in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the United States Supreme 
Court held that a New York statute that barred class certifications in 
cases in which plaintiffs pursue certain types of claims did not pre­
clude a federal court sitting in diversity from certifying such a class 
action when plaintiffs assert such claims.30 The Supreme Court rea­
soned that the New York rule was procedural and that Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23, which does not bar class actions in such situations, 
controlled. 31 
The district court concluded that Shady Grove did not control the 
question of whether a royalty class action could proceed in a Louisi­
ana federal court without each member of the proposed class having 
satisfied the notice requirement specified in Article 137.32 The district 
court reasoned that Mineral Code Article 137 and the articles that 
accompany it contain substantive and procedural provisions that are 
so intertwined they cannot be separated.33 Therefore, class certifica­
tion was not proper on the royalty claims.34 
Finally, the court considered the plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrich­
ment and their motion for certification of a class to pursue those 
claims.35 The court granted Chesapeake's motion to deny certification 
of those claims, as well as Chesapeake's motion to dismiss those 
claims on summary judgment.36 Under Louisiana law, a claim for un­
just enrichment is unavailable if the law provides any other remedy.37 
Because Louisiana allows a claim for underpayment of royalties, the 
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment.38 
3. Whether Royalties are Owed on Hedging Profits 
In Cimarex Energy Co. v. Chastant, Cimarex was a mineral lessee, 
and Chastant was the lessor. 39 The mineral lease required royalties to 
28. Id. at *2. 
29. Id. at *4. 
30. Id. at *3. 
31. Id. at *4. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at *5. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at *6. 
36. Id. at *8. •JO. 
37. Id. at •8. 
38. Id. at •9. 
39. Cimarex Energy Co. v. Chastant, Nos. 6:11-CV-1713, 6:11-CV-2146, 2012 WL 
6652360 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2012), aff d, 2013 WL 3964121 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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be paid on oil based on the market price "f.o.b" and for royalties to be 
paid on gas based on the market value at the mouth of the well.40 
Cimarex had earned some profits through "hedging,"41-a type of 
transaction in which a company protects itself against the risk that a 
commodity will drop in price by purchasing futures contracts for that 
commodity.42 Chastant argued that Cimarex owed royalties on those 
profits. Chastant noted that Cimarex had included hedging profits in 
the commodity prices it reported in certain filings with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.43 Chastant also cited Frey v. Amoco Pro­
duction, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a lessee 
owed royalties on a take-or-pay case settlement because the settle­
ment was an "economic benefit accruing from the leased land, gener­
ated solely by virtue of the lease."44 Chastant's arguments were 
rejected by the court, which held that Cimarex did not owe royalties 
on its hedging profits.45 
4. Deductibility of Post-Production Costs 
In Dickson v. Sklarco, L.L.C., the plaintiffs and their predecessors 
in interest granted a series of oil and gas leases to Sklarco, L.L.C. 
("Sklarko") for certain land in Caddo Parish in 2005.46 Sklarco 
granted a sublease to Petrohawk Properties, LP ("Petrohawk") for 
depths below the Hosston formation.47 Petrohawk established produc­
tion of natural gas and began paying royalties.48 At first, Petrohawk 
paid royalties that were calculated based on the sales price of the gas, 
without any deduction of post-production costs.49 Later, Petrohawk 
began taking a deduction for gathering and transportation costs. 50 The 
plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that Petrohawk was not entitled to de­
duct such costs. 51 
Both the plaintiffs and Petrohawk moved for summary judgment, 
each asserting that the lease was unambiguous.52 The court began its 
analysis of the leases by noting that the parties used "Bath" form 
leases.53 The printed portion of the leases provided that the royalties 
to be paid by the lessee to the lessor would be "on gas ... sold . . .  off 
40. Id. at *1-2. 
41. Id. at *l. 
42. Id. at *2. 
43. Id. 
44. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166 ( La. 1992). 
45. Cimarex Energy Co., 2012 WL 6652360, at *4. 
46. Dickinson v. Sklarco, L.L.C., No. 5:11-CV-00352, 2013WL 1828051 (W.D. La. 
Apr. 29, 2013). 
47. Id. at *l. 




52. Id. at *1-2. 
53. Id. at *5. 
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the premises ... the market value at the well of one-fifth (1/5) of the 
gas so sold ... , provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall 
be one-fifth (115) of the amount realized from such sale ... . "54 The 
court noted that the proper interpretation of such a clause is well­
established under Louisiana jurisprudence for circumstances in which 
a Jessee sells gas away from the well and incurs costs in moving the gas 
from the well to the place of sale.55 In such circumstances, the royalty 
should be calculated based on the "gross proceeds of the sale," minus 
"costs of taking the gas from the wellhead to ... the point of sale." 5 6  
The court noted that, if the printed provision had been the only provi­
sion relevant to the deductibility of costs, the court's analysis "would 
end here. " 57 
But the parties attached to each lease an "Exhibit B" that contained 
additional clauses, one of which was a paragraph that discussed de­
ductibility of costs.5 8 The paragraph stated: 
The parties agree that post production costs may be deducted from 
... the proceeds from the sale of ... natural gas ... insofar and only 
insofar as such costs either enhance the value of the product being 
sold and the price obtained for such product or are required to 
make the product marketable. Without limitation upon the forego­
ing, the treating, processing, or dehydrating of natural gas to meet 
pipeline quality specifications shall be deemed to enhance the value 
of the product being sold.59 
The plaintiffs argued that this clause precluded the deduction of 
gathering and transport costs.6 0 They asserted that, under the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis, the effect of listing "treating, processing, or dehy­
drating" as specific examples of deductible costs was to limit deducti­
ble costs to costs of "the same class," and that gathering and 
transporting costs were not in the same class.61 The court rejected that 
argument, noting that the lease clause stated that the listed examples 
were "without limitation upon" the clause's general description of the 
types of costs that would be deductible.62 The court concluded that 
this prevented application of the ejusdem generis doctrine.6 3 
Petrohawk argued that the clause, which they called "Paragraph 8," 
unambiguously allowed the deduction of gathering and transport costs 




57. Id. at *6. 
58. Id. at *2. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61 .  Id. at *6-7. 
62. Id. at •7. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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The court seemed to agree, stating, "The Court agrees that under its 
interpretation of Paragraph 8 alone, gathering and transportation 
costs could be deducted from royalty payments as long as those costs 
were shown to enhance the value of the product being sold and the 
price obtained."65 Thus, under the court's reasoning, Petrohawk 
should prevail under the royalty clause of the printed lease, if it was 
read alone, or paragraph 8 of Exhibit B, if it was read alone. 
But the court saw what it believed was a problem with Petrohawk's 
argument. If Paragraph 8 of Exhibit B was given its natural reading, it 
would have virtually the same meaning as the royalty clause in the 
printed portion of the lease.66 The court had concluded, however, that 
each paragraph in Exhibit B was intended to alter some clause in the 
printed form.67 Therefore, reasoned the court, Exhibit B created "am­
biguity" regarding the parties' intent.68 Accordingly, the court denied 
both parties' motions for summary judgment.69 
C. Lease Maintenance Disputes: Judicial Ascertainment Clause 
In B.A. Kelly Land Co. L.L.C. v. Questar Exploration and Produc­
tion Co., a mineral lessor filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the mineral lease covering its property had expired subsequent to 
the primary term, because the lessees did not produce minerals or 
conduct operations for a period of several consecutive months. 70 
The lessees contested the lessor's claim, arguing that the lease had 
not terminated for two independent reasons. First, the lease's haben­
dum clause provided that the lease would remain in effect for the pri­
mary term "and as long thereafter" as minerals were produced or the 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at *8. 
67. Id. at *7. 
68. Id. at *9. The court's reasoning can be questioned. Although the court referred 
to the existence of an "ambiguity," the court actually seems to have concluded that 
the two royalty clauses-one in the printed form and one in the typewritten form­
were each unambiguous and that each allowed for the deduction of post-production 
costs, provided that those costs increased the value of the gas. What the court appar­
ently meant when it referred to "ambiguity" was that that court had concluded that 
the parties' actual intent must have been different than what was stated in the type­
written form because the court was convinced that the parties must have intended for 
every I?r�vision in the typewritten form to modify some provision in the printed form. 
But th1� ignores the possibility that the parties intended for the royalty clause in the 
typewritten form to clarify the printed form, rather than modify it. Under Louisiana 
law, the court should apply the language of the contract as written, and should not 
resort to the consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract in the ab­
senc� o� ambiguity or absurd result. LA. Civ. CooE art. 2046. It does not appear that 
amb1gwty was present or that an absurd result would occur if the lease was inter­
preted as written. 
69. Dickinson, 2013 WL 1828051, at *9 . 
. 70. B.A. Kelly Land Co. v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., 47,509 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/12); 106 So. 3d 181, 184-85. 
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lease was "maintained in any other manner provided."71 The lessees 
asserted that the lease's force majeure and shut-in clauses each pro­
vided ··other manners" for maintaining the lease and that the lease 
had been maintained pursuant to one or the other of those clauses.72 
Second, even if one of those clauses did not maintain the lease, the 
"judicial ascertainment" clause prevented termination because that 
clause establishes certain conditions for lease termination that had not 
been satisfied.73 The clause states that, once the lessee had produced 
minerals, 
this lease shall not be subject to forfeiture or loss, either in whole or 
part. for failure to conduct operations in compliance with this con­
tract except after judicial ascertainment that Lessee has failed to 
conduct such operations and has been given a reasonable opportu­
nity after such judicial ascertainment to prevent such loss or forfei­
ture by complying with and discharging its obligations as to which 
Lessee has been judicially determined to be default.74 
The lessees argued that this "judicial ascertainment clause" prevented 
lease termination because the lessor had never obtained the required 
"judicial ascertainment" or given the lessees a chance to cure any 
default.7:" 
The lessor replied that the shut-in clause did not apply under the 
circumstances that had existed during the period of non-production.76 
Further, the lack of production was a resolutory condition that caused 
automatic termination of the lease. Thus, the judicial ascertainment 
clause did not apply.77 Moreover, the lessees were not entitled to an 
opportunity to cure because once the lease has terminated for non­
production, subsequent production cannot retroactively revive the 
lease.78 The district court dismissed the lessor's claims and denied the 
lessor's request to amend its petition to request a judicial ascertain­
ment.79 The lessor appealed.80 
The Louisiana Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
judicial ascertainment clause would prevent automatic termination, 
provided that there was a bona fide dispute regarding termination, 
and that there was a bona fide dispute regarding whether the shut-in 
clause had prevented termination of the lease.81 Accordingly, the les-
71. S<'<' id. at 184 nn. l, 2 (citing habendum clause). 
72. Id. at 192. 
73. Id. at 188. 
74. Id. at 184-85. 
75. Id. at 186. 
76. Id. 
77. It/. at 189. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 186. 
80. Id. at 184. 
. 81. Id. at 192. Though the plaintiffs' argument was rejected by the appellate court. 
It should he noted that there is some authority to support the plaintiffs' position. LA. 
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sor's suit seeking a declaration that the lease had terminated was pre­
mature.82 But rather than affirming the dismissal, the appellate court 
remanded, holding that the district court had erred when it denied the 
lessor's request for leave to amend its petition to seek a judicial ascer­
tainment regarding whether the shut-in clause applied.83 
D. JOA Dispute-Applicability of JOA to Future Leases 
In Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates Petroleum Co., Clovelly Oil and 
Midstates Petroleum each became parties to a 1972 joint operating 
agreement ("JOA") through assignments of interest.84 The JOA was 
based on the 1956 version of the "AAPL Form 610 - Model Form 
Operating Agreement."85 The JOA provided that Clovelly owned a 
56.25% interest in the mineral rights governed by the JOA and that 
Midstates owned the remainder. 86 
A dispute arose after Midstates acquired a new mineral lease in 
2008 that covered an area near the original leases that were governed 
by the JOA.87 Clovelly argued that it was entitled to a 56.25% interest 
in the new lease.88 Clovelly noted that the text of the JOA stated that 
"the lands, oil and gas leasehold interests and oil and gas interests 
intended to be developed and operated under this agreement" were 
"described in 'Exhibit A.' "89 Exhibit A, which was titled "Lands sub­
ject to this agreement," described a geographical area that included 
the land covered by Midstates' new lease.90 Effectively, Clovelly ar­
gued that this language operated like an area of mutual interest 
clause.91 
Midstates disagreed. Midstates noted that the JOA used present 
tense language when it described the mineral interests to which the 
JOA would apply.92 For example, the JOA's preamble states: 
[T]he parties . . . are owners of oil and gas leases covering and, if so 
indicated, unleased mineral interests in the tracts of land described 
in Exhibit "A,'' and all parties have reached an agreement to ex­
plore and develop these leases and interests for oil and gas . . . . 93 
REv. STAT. 31:133 & cmt. (2013); see also PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. 
KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 682.2 (2010). 
82. B.A. Kelly Land Co., 106 So. 3d at 193. 
83. Id. 
84. Clovelly Oil Co. , v. Midstates Petroleum Co., 2012-2055 (La. 3/19/13); 112 So. 
3d 187, 189. 
85. Id. at 190. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 191. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 190-91. 
91. Id. at 191. 
92. Id. at 192-93. 
93. Id. at 190 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, the JOA defined "oil and gas interests" by referring to in­
terests that "are owned by the parties."94 
The district court granted summary judgment for Midstates, but the 
Louisiana Third Circuit reversed, stating that Exhibit A conflicted 
with the printed portions of the JOA that referred to interests in the 
present tense.95 The appellate court held that, under traditional rules 
of contract interpretation, the language of Exhibit A would prevail 
because it was typewritten and thus was more likely to reflect the true 
intent of the parties than the other, pre-printed portions of the JOA.96 
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision 
and reinstated judgment for Midstates.97 The Court agreed that type­
written language generally will prevail over printed language when a 
conflict between them is irreconcilable, but a court should attempt to 
reconcile different portions of a contract, even if one of the portions is 
printed and the other is typed.98 Here, the purported conflict between 
different portions of the JOA could be reconciled if the JOA was in­
terpreted as applying only to mineral leases and other mineral inter­
ests owned by the parties when the JOA was entered, with Exhibit A 
describing a geographical area within which all those interests were 
located.99 
The Court explained that such an interpretation was reasonable be­
cause the parties had not entered a separate area of mutual interest 
agreement ("AMI"), which parties commonly do when they want a 
JOA to apply to future leases.100 The court also cited commentators 
who have noted that JOAs typically do not apply to future leases in 
the absence of an AMI.101 Indeed, the American Association of Pro­
fessional Landmen, the promulgator of the model form used by the 
parties, had filed an amicus brief supporting Midstates's position.102 
E. Unit Disputes 
1. Formation of Voluntary Units 
In Midnight Drilling, LLC v. Triche, Midnight Drilling drilled and 
completed a well, which began producing oil and gas in 2009.103 The 
Louisiana Office of Conservation entered an order creating a compul­
sory unit, designating Midnight's well as the unit well and naming 
94. Id. at 190 (emphasis added). 
95. Id. at 191. 
96. Id. at 193. 
97. Id. at 196. 
98. Id. at 193-94. 
99. Id. at 194. 
100. Id. at 195. 
101. Id. at 195-96. 
102. Id. at 196 n.35. 
103. Midnight Drilling. LLC v. Triche, No. 2012 CA 1043, 2013 WL 3149456 (La. 
Ct. App. June 19, 2013). 
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Midnight as the operator.104 The unit covered an area where Midnight 
had executed multiple mineral leases as lessee.105 Because numerous 
lessors disputed who had a right to receive lease royalty payments, 
Midnight filed a concursus action.106 
The rival claimants for the disputed mineral royalties were the 
"Triches" and the "Cole group. "107 The Triches owned two tracts of 
land, one located to the north of the Intercoastal Waterway, and the 
other located to the south of the Waterway, but they did not own the 
land under the Intercoastal Waterway itself.108 The Cole group inher­
ited a mineral servitude that covered the north tract and a separate 
mineral servitude that covered the south tract.109 The servitudes were 
created when the Cole group's predecessor-in-interest had sold the 
two tracts but reserved mineral rights for each.11° 
The royalties in dispute were royalties attributable to the north 
tract, which was within the compulsory unit. The Triches argued that 
they were entitled to the disputed royalties because the mineral servi­
tude covering that tract had terminated by prescription of nonuse 
before 2009.111 The Cole group disagreed, asserting that prescription 
of nonuse had been interrupted by the drilling of an earlier well, the 
Cole #2 Well, and that the servitude therefore had not terminated.112 
The Cole group advanced two arguments in support of their conten­
tion that the drilling of the earlier well (the Cole #2 Well) interrupted 
prescription. First, it argued that the parties had created a voluntary 
unit for the Cole #2 Well and that the unit area included the northern 
104. Id. at *1. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. A concursus is similar to an interpleader action. Cimarex Energy Co. v. 
Mauboules, 2009-1170 (La. 4/9/10); 40 So. 3d 931, 938-39; compare LA. CoDE Civ. 
PRoc. ANN. arts. 4651-62 (1998), with FED. R. Crv. P. 22, and 28 U.S.C. § 1335 
(2012). 
107. Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456, at *1. Louisiana law does not recog­
nize mineral estates. Hodges v. Long Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So. 2d 831, 836 (La. 
1959). But it recognizes mineral servitudes. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000). A 
mineral servitude is similar to a mineral estate, except that a mineral servitude termi­
nates by prescription of nonuse if it is not used for any ten-year period. § 31:27. For 
purposes of interrupting prescription of nonuse, a "use" is either the production of 
minerals to which the servitude applies or good faith drilling in an attempt to produce 
such minerals. §§ 31:29, 31:36. 
108. Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456, at *1. 
. 109. Under Louisiana law, a person cannot create a servitude that covers noncon­tiguous tracts. § 31:64. Because the north and south tracts were separated by land 
owned by someone other than the Triches, the servitude rights inherited by the Cole 
group. constituted two separate servitudes-one covering the north tract and the other covermg the south tract. See Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456 at *l. 
110. Id. 
111.. I� a couple of places in the opinion, the First Circuit referred to "liberative prescnpt10n,
:' but that reference is erroneous. See id. at *2. Although prescription of 
n?nyse prev10usly was. classified as a form of liberative prescription, the Louisiana 
C:IVll Code now recogmzes that liberative prescription and prescription of nonuse are 
different types of prescription. LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 3445 cmt. (b) (2007). 
112. Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456, at *2. 
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tract.113 The Cole group did not allege that the parties had agreed in 
writing to create a unit. Instead, the Cole group claimed that the par­
ties "acted in such a manner that the Cole #2 well was produced on a 
unit basis" and that they had created a voluntary unit through their 
conduct.114 
The Louisiana First Circuit rejected that argument. The court noted 
that mineral servitudes are classified as "incorporeal immovables" 
under Louisiana law, and agreements transferring rights relating to 
immovables generally must be in writing. 115 The court then concluded 
that the parol evidence rule barred the Cole group's argument that the 
parties created a voluntary unit through their conduct.116 
The Cole group's second argument was based on the fact that, al­
though the Cole #2 well was not bottomed beneath the northern tract, 
the well was a directional well that had been drilled from a surface 
location on the northern tract.117 The Cole group argued that the drill­
ing on the northern tract interrupted prescription.118 The First Circuit 
also rejected that argument.119 The court held that the bottom hole 
location from which oil and gas would be produced, not the surface 
well site, was the critical location for determining whether the drilling 
of the well interrupted prescription.120 Because the bottom hole loca­
tion was not beneath the northern tract, and because the well was not 
a unit well for a unit that included the servitude tract at issue, the 
drilling of the well did not interrupt prescription of nonuse.121 
2. Alternate Unit Wells 
In Walker v. 1-W Operating Co., the Commissioner of Conservation 
established units in Caspiana Field following the discovery of natural 
gas there in the 1970s. 122 The Commissioner's orders included findings 
of fact that each unit could be efficiently drained by one well.123 Be­
ginning in the 1990s, various companies requested approval for "alter­
nate unit wells" to be drilled as additional wells within existing units 
that already had a unit well.124 The companies asserted that newer 
geologic evidence showed that the existing unit wells were not eco-
113. Id. at *3. 
114. A unit can he created by order of the Com missioner of Conservation or by 
�greement of th.
e l?arties . LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(6) (2013). Unit activity can 
mkrrupt prescription of nonuse. §§ 31:33-36. 
1 1 5. Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456, at *3. 
1 1 6. Id. at *3-4. 
1 17. Id. at *4. 
118. Id. 
1 1 9. Id. at *4-5. 
120. Id. at *5. 
121. Id. at *6. 
122. Walker v. J-W Operating Co., No. 2012 CA 0662, 2012 WL 6677913, at *8 (La. 
Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012). 
123. Id. at *1. 
124. Id. at *2. 
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nomically and efficiently draining their units.12 5 After public hearings, 
the Commissioner approved numerous alternate unit wells, several of 
which were drilled on land that was owned by the plaintiffs, but bur­
dened by a mineral servitude.12 6 
The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
Commissioner lacked authority to approve alternate unit wells be­
cause Louisiana Revised Statute 30:9 defines a unit to be "the maxi­
mum area which may be efficiently and economically drained by one 
well."12 7 The court noted, however, that the issue was not the initial 
establishment of a unit well, but what the Commissioner has authority 
to do when evidence shows that an existing unit well is not efficiently 
draining the unit.12 8 The plaintiffs argued that the Commissioner's 
only option is to reconfigure units, but the Louisiana First Circuit dis­
agreed, holding that the Commissioner has discretion to approve al­
ternate unit wells in order to prevent the waste of resources.12 9 
F. Unit Operator's Duty to Send Reports to Unleased 
Mineral Interest Owners 
In certain circumstances, Louisiana law requires the operator of a 
unit well to give the owners of unleased mineral interests "a sworn, 
detailed, itemized statement" containing "the costs of drilling, com­
pleting, and equipping the unit well. "13 0 If an operator fails to comply 
with this requirement and then does not send the required reports 
within thirty days after receiving written notice of such failure, the 
operator can forfeit its right to demand that the owner of the unleased 
interest contribute its share of the costs of drilling and completing the 
well.131 Two recent cases have applied these statutes in circumstances 
that required the court to interpret the statutes. 
1. In What Circumstances Does the Duty to Send Reports Apply 
In Adams v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., the court interprets two 
statutes: one that governs the duty of a unit operator to send certain 
reports to unleased owners and a second that establishes a penalty 
that can apply if the operator breaches its reporting duty.13 2 
The primary difficulty in the interpretation of the statutes is deter­
mining what circumstances will trigger the duty to report. Louisiana 
Revised Statute 30:103.l(A) states that the operator of a unit well for 
125. Id. at *l. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at *4. 
128. Id. at *5. 
129. Id. at *6. 
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:103.1 (2013). 
131. § 30:103.2. 
132. Adams v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. 11-CV-1504, 2013 WL 1193716 
(W.D. La. Mar. 21, 2013). 
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a compulsory unit ''shall issue" detailed reports of drilling costs to the 
owners of unleased mineral interests within ninety days of completion 
of the well.133 If read in isolation, that provision suggests that the op­
erator of a compulsory unit always has a duty to send reports to the 
owners of unleased mineral interests. On the other hand, a separate 
paragraph in the same statute, Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.l(C), 
states that the operator must send such reports "by certified mail to 
each owner of an unleased oil or gas interest who has requested such 
reports in writing, by certified mail addressed to the operator."134 If 
read in isolation, this second provision clearly suggests that the duty to 
report does not apply unless the owner of an unleased mineral sends 
written requests via certified mail. 
One way to reconcile the two provisions is to interpret Revised 
Statute 30:103.l(C) as governing whether a duty to report applies, and 
to interpret 30:103.l(A), which contains much more detail regarding 
what must be reported, as governing what must be reported and how 
quickly it must be reported. Another way to reconcile the two provi­
sions would be that 30:103.l(A) establishes a reporting duty that al­
ways applies and that 30:103.l(C) establishes a process by which an 
unleased mineral interest owner can demand that the reports he re­
quests be sent by certified mail. 
The second statute, Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.2, establishes 
the penalty than can apply. The statute states: 
133. In its entirety, the provision states: 
A. Whenever there is included within a drilling unit, as authorized by the 
commissioner of conservation, lands producing oil or gas, or both, upon 
which the operator or producer has no valid oil, gas, or mineral lease, said 
operator or producer shall issue the following reports to the owners of said 
interests by a sworn, detailed, itemized statement: 
( 1) Within ninety calendar days from completion of the well, an initial report 
which shall contain the costs of drilling, completing, and equipping the unit 
well. 
(2) After establishment of production from the unit well, quarterly reports 
which shall contain the following: 
(a) The total amount of oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons produced from the 
lands during the previous quarter. 
(b) The price received from any purchaser of unit production. 
(c) Quarterly operating costs and expenses. 
(d) Any additional funds expended to enhance or restore the production of 
the unit well. 
§ 30: 103.l{A). 
134. Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.l(C) states: 
Reports shall he sent by certified mail to each owner of an unleased oil or 
gas interest who has requested such reports in writing, by certified mail ad­
dressed to the operator or producer. The written request shall contain the 
unleased interest owner's name and address. Initial reports shall be sent no 
later than ninety calendar days after the completion of the well. The opera­
tor or producer
. 
s�all begin �ending quarterly reports within ninety calendar 
days after rece1vmg the written request, whichever is later, and shall con­
tinue sending quarterly reports until cessation of production. 
§ 30:103.l(C). 
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Whenever the operator permits ninety calendar days to elapse from 
completion of the well and thirty additional calendar days to elapse 
from date of receipt of written notice by certified mail from the 
owner or owners of unleased oil and gas interests calling attention 
to failure to comply with the provision of R.S. 30:103.1, such opera­
tor or producer shall forfeit his right to demand contribution from 
the owner or owners of the unleased oil and gas interests for the 
costs of the drilling operations of the well.135 
In Adams, the plaintiff, his siblings, and his son were owners of an 
unleased mineral interest in a compulsory unit for which Chesapeake 
drilled a unit well in October 2010.136 In February 2011, the plaintiff, 
his siblings, and his son each sent a certified letter to Chesapeake, 
stating that the company had "failed to comply with the provisions of 
Louisiana RS 30:103.1."137 The letters also requested copies of the re­
ports required by Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.1.138 Within a 
short time, Chesapeake sent copies of the required reports to the 
plaintiff's siblings and son, but did not send a report to the plaintiff.139 
The plaintiff did not contact Chesapeake again about the issue until 
mid-April, when his attorney sent a letter to Chesapeake.140 The letter 
stated that Chesapeake had forfeited its right to demand contribution 
from the plaintiff for his share of drilling costs because the company 
had not sent a report of costs to the plaintiff.141 Chesapeake sent a 
copy of the report to the plaintiff later that month, but the plaintiff 
filed suit, seeking a judgment that Chesapeake had forfeited its right 
to seek a contribution for drilling costs from him.142 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisi­
ana rejected the plaintiff's claims.143 The court held that the Louisiana 
Revised Statute 30:103.l reporting duty does not apply unless and un­
til the unleased mineral interest owner has sent a written request by 
certified mail.144 Because the plaintiff's February 2011 letter to Chesa­
peake was the plaintiff's first letter requesting a report, Chesapeake 
did not have a duty to send a report until it received that letter.145 
The court also analyzed Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.2. The 
court noted that this statute imposes a penalty on an operator who 
fails to send a report within thirty days of receiving written notice of 
his "failure to comply" with the reporting requirements of 30:103.1.146 
135. § 30:103.2. 
136. Adams, 2013 WL 1193716, at *1. 
137. Id. at *1-2. 





143. Id. at *6. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at *4. 
146. Id. at *4, *6. 
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The court reasoned that the plaintiff's February 201 1  letter to Chesa­
peake could not serve as written notice of its "failure to comply" with 
the duty to send reports because that duty did not exist until Chesa­
peake received the February 201 1  letter.1 47 Thus, the company's first 
written notice of its failure to comply with its reporting duties was 
when it received the mid-April letter from the plaintiff's lawyer. Be­
cause Chesapeake sent the required reports within thirty days of re­
ceiving the lawyer's letter, the 30:1 03.2 penalty did not apply. 
2. What Constitutes a Detailed Report 
In Brannon Properties, LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., the par­
ties disputed whether a report that the operator sent contained suffi­
cient detail to satisfy the operator's statutory duty to send well cost 
reports to unleased mineral interest owners. 148 
There, Chesapeake was the operator of a unit well for a compulsory 
unit, and Brannon Properties was an unleased mineral interest 
owner. 14 9 Chesapeake sent a report to Brannon within the time re­
quired, but the parties disputed whether the report was sufficiently 
"detailed" to satisfy the statutory requirement that an operator pro­
vide a "detailed" statement of costs.1 5° Chesapeake's report, which 
was eighteen pages long, listed the date and dollar amount of ex­
penses and identified each expense as being either a "Tangible Drill­
ing and Completion" cost or an "Intangible Drilling and Completion" 
cost.151  The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
the report was not sufficient to satisfy the statutory duty to provide a 
report that contains a detailed list of drilling expenses. 152 The court 
acknowledged that the statute, which imposes the duty, does not spec­
ify what information is required, but the court stated that the list, 
which Chesapeake provided to Brannon, could not satisfy any reason­
able understanding of the word "detailed." 1 53 The court contrasted 
the report to other reports that Chesapeake had provided, including a 
report for a different well that contained a description of the type of 
equipment, supplies, or service associated with each cost.154 Because 
the report at issue did not satisfy statutory requirements, the court 
held that Chesapeake had forfeited its right to demand that B rannon 
pay its share of d rilling costs for the unit well. 155 
147. Id. at "'4. 
1 48. Brannon Props.,  LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, I nc., No. 12-30306, 2013 WL 
657781 (5th Cir. Feb. 2 1 ,  201 3). 
149. Id. at "' I .  
150. Id. 
1 5 1 .  Id. 
152. Id. at "'2, *4. 
153. Id. at "'2. 
1 54. Id. at *3. 
1 55. Id. at •4. 
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G. A cquisitive Prescription 
In Roberts v. Patterson, the plaintiff owned and held record title to 
certain property in Bossier Parish.156 She had acquired the property 
from her father, who had owned it since the 1950s . 1 57 During that en­
tire time, a fence had stood along a line that the plaintiff thought was 
the north border of the property. 158 But the fence was, in fact, some­
what north of the property line, so that the fence enclosed 2.2 acres to 
which the plaintiff did not have record title. 159 
In 1 999, a company called Investors Property Group ("IPG") pur­
chased a tract that included the 2.2 acres.160 IPG later leased the 2.2 
acres to lessees for use as pastureland, and those lessees erected a 
fence enclosing the 2.2 acres .161 The plaintiff then brought a posses­
sory action, claiming to have the right to possess the property. 1 62 IPG 
intervened, asserting ownership of the property and thereby con­
verting the litigation to a petitory action. 163 
The trial court heard evidence and entered a judgment that the 
plaintiff had acquired ownership of the surface by thirty years acquisi­
tive prescription.164 But the court held that the plaintiff had not ac­
quired ownership of mineral rights because she had not used the 
mineral rights and therefore had not "possessed" them.165 The plain­
tiff appealed the portion of the judgment holding that she had not 
acquired mineral rights. The other parties did not appeal.166 
The appellate court reversed.1 67 The court noted that Mineral Code 
Article 160 states: "When title to land is perfected by a possessor on 
the basis of acquisitive prescription, the title includes mineral rights to 
the extent that his possession included mineral rights for the required 
prescriptive period. "168 
The appellate court appears to have reached the correct conclusion. 
Further, Mineral Code Article 160, which the appellate court cited, 
ultimately controls the result. But that article does not fully explain 
the apparent error in the district court's reasoning because Article 160 
merely provides that a person who obtains ownership of land by ac­
quisitive prescription also acquires ownership of mineral rights "to the 
extent that his possession included mineral rights ."  But given that 
156. Roberts v. Patterson, 47, 576 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1116/13); 108 So. 3d 816. 







164. Id. at 818. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 818-19. 
168. Id. at 818. 
2014] LO UISIANA 121 
mineral rights may be "possessed" by using them, 169 and that the 
plaintiff had not used the mineral rights, someone might conclude that 
Article 160 was consistent with the district court's decision, rather 
than with the appellate court's decision. Yet such a conclusion would 
be erroneous. Mineral Code Article 155, which was not explicitly cited 
by the appellate court, provides that a person who does not have title, 
but who possesses property as if he were the owner, "possesses the 
mineral rights inherent in perfecting ownership of land."170 That pos­
session can be lost if someone else actually uses the mineral rights,171 
but apparently no one else had used the mineral rights during the 
thirty-year period in which the plaintiff was acquiring ownership via 
acquisitive prescription. 
H. Usufructs 
In Quantum Resources Management, L. L. C. v. Pirate Lake Oil 
Corp. , Mr. and Mrs. Jones had three children.172 Mrs. Jones died tes­
tate, bequeathing to Mr. Jones all of her property, including certain 
land that was separate property and subject to a mineral lease. 173 But 
the children were forced heirs, and in a succession proceeding, the 
legacy to Mr. Jones was reduced to a one-half interest in the property 
and a usufruct174 over the remaining one-half interest.175 No oil or gas 
well existed on the property prior to Mrs. Jones death, but two wells 
were drilled between the time of her death and the time of the court 
order reducing Mr. Jones's legacy.176 Mr. Jones and his daughter dis­
puted who was entitled to royalties from the wells, so the operators of 
the wells filed a concursus. 177 
Article 190(B) of the Mineral Code governs the extent to which a 
usufructuary of land has a right to proceeds from minerals when the 
"usufruct is that of a surviving spouse," but Louisiana's Fifth Circuit 
concluded that article 190(B) did not apply. 178 The court reasoned 
169. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3 1:153 (2013).  
170. § 31:155. 
171 . § 31:156. 
172. Quantum Res. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 12-256 (La. App. 5 Cir. 
1 1/13/12); 105 So. 3d 867. 
173. Id. at 869. 
174. A "[u]sufruct is a real right of limited duration on the property of another." 
!--A. C1v. CooE ANN. art. ?35 (2013); see also art. 890 (regarding usufruct of a surviv­
ing spous�). If a usufruct 1s for the life of the usufructuary (the person who receives 
the benefit of the usufruct), the usufruct is somewhat like a life estate. See Pendegast 
v. Scha�tz, 30 La. Ann. 590 (La. 1878) (comparing usufruct to a life estate); but see 
Succession of Hunter, 105 So. 596, (La. 1925) (holding that the wording of particular 
bequest could n<?t be construed as a usufruct and instead was an attempt to designate 
a common law hfe estate, which is not recognized under Louisiana law). 
175. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 869-70. 
178. Id. at 873. 
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that Mr. Jones had inherited the usufruct in the capacity of a legatee, 
not as a surviving spouse.179 
The court determined that Mr. Jones's usufruct was a conventional 
usufruct and that Mineral Code Article 190(A) applied. 180 It provides 
that "if there is no provision including the use and enjoyment of min­
eral rights in a conventional usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to 
the use and enjoyment of the landowner's rights in minerals as to 
mines or quarries actually worked at the time the usufruct was cre­
ated. "181 With respect to oil and gas, Mineral Code Article 191 ex­
plains that this means the usufructuary is entitled to "the landowner's 
rights in minerals as to all pools penetrated" by any wells that were 
producing or capable of producing when the usufruct was created. 182 
Mr. Jones's daughter argued that Mr. Jones's usufruct was created 
at the time of Mrs. Jones's death (before any wells existed) because a 
legatee's right to inherited property arises at the time of a testator's 
death, but the court disagreed.183 Mrs. Jones's testament had granted 
her husband full ownership.184 The succession proceeding court re­
duced Mr. Jones's legacy (and substituted a usufruct) because it im­
pinged on the children's rights as forced heirs, but forced heirs can 
waive their rights, and such rights do not affect a succession until as­
serted and recognized by a court.185 Thus, Mr. Jones was entitled to 
proceeds from the well that was drilled after his wife died and before 
the judgment reducing his legacy.186 
I. Trespass Claim and Civil Code Article 670 Predial Servitude 
In SGC Land, LLC v. Louisiana Midstream Gas Services, Chesa­
peake had acquired a mineral lease that contained two clauses, which 
had the effect of generally prohibiting Chesapeake from using the 
leased premises for any purpose other than the support of a well 
drilled on the premises.187 After Chesapeake began drilling a well on 
the leased premises, the company and the lessors entered a surface 
use agreement that authorized Chesapeake to construct a pipeline on 
the premises, but which also provided that the pipeline could only 
carry gas from wells drilled on the leased premises.188 Chesapeake as­
signed its rights to Louisiana Midstream Gas Services, Inc. ("Mid-
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 871-72. 
182. Id. at 872. 
183. Id. at 870. 
184. Id. at 873. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 874. 
187. SGC Land, LLC v. La. Midstream Gas Servs., 939 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 (W.D. 
La. 2013). 
188. Id. 
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stream"), which entered a third agreement with the lessors.189 This 
agreement granted �dstream t�e right to con�tr1:1ct and operate a 
pipeline along a specified route without any restnct10ns on the source 
of the gas that the pipeline carried.190 
Midstream constructed a pipeline across the leased premises and 
began using it to carry both gas produced from the leased premises 
and "third party gas" produced from other property.191 The plaintiffs 
discovered, however, that there was a section of pipeline "less than 30 
feet" in length that strayed outside the route designated in the Ease­
ment and Right of Way by an amount "no more than 4.4 feet."192 The 
plaintiffs brought suit for trespass, seeking a disgorgement of all prof­
its earned by use of the pipeline.193 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisi­
ana noted that, under Louisiana law, a disgorgement of profits is not 
an available remedy for unauthorized possession of property unless 
the possession is in bad faith.194 The court noted that the contracts 
authorized Midstream to construct and operate a pipeline "anywhere 
on the property,"  s o  long as it did not carry third party gas, and that 
the contracts authorized Midstream to construct and operate a pipe­
line that carried third party gas, as long as it followed a specified 
route.195 The court concluded that the construction of the pipeline 
about four feet outside the route that was designated for a line that 
would carry third party gas "did not harm Plaintiffs" and did not ap­
pear to bring "any additional profits" to the lessees.196 Further, the 
court stated that, "the entire record reveals an inadvertent surveying 
mistake, not bad faith." Thus, the remedy of disgorgement of profits 
was not available.197 
The court found that the most appropriate damages analysis was 
derived from the doctrine of encroachment, which is found in Civil 
Code Article 670.198 The article provides that, when a landowner in 
good faith constructs a building that encroaches on the neighboring 
property, and the neighbor does not complain until after the construc­
tion is substantially complete, the landowner who constructed the 
building is entitled to a predial servitude that allows the building to 








196. Id. at 620. 
197. Id. Further, the court concluded that the violation committed by the lessees 
was "more accurately classified as a breach of contract, not a trespass." Id. at 619. 
198. Id. at 620. 
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tude.199 The court held that the defendants were entitled to a servi­
tude for a "for a reasonable area surrounding the pipeline," subject to 
the obligation to pay the landowners for that servitude.200 
The plaintiffs also sought lease dissolution based on the apparently 
undisputed fact that Chesapeake had used a frac pond and other facil­
ities on the leased premises to support both the well drilled on the 
leased premises and a well drilled on other property.201 Chesapeake 
argued that the lease prohibited the lessee from using the leased 
premises to support operations on other land until the first well was 
drilled on the leased premises, but allowed the leased premises to be 
used after that time to support operations on other land.202 The court 
rejected Chesapeake's interpretation and concluded that Chesa­
peake's use of the facilities to support drilling activities on other 
properties was a violation of the lease.203 But the court also noted that 
the surface use restrictions in the lease were "inartfully worded "204 
and that Chesapeake could have reached its interpretation of the sur­
face use restrictions in good faith.205 Under Louisiana law, a party's 
right to dissolution of a lease is subject to judicial control.206 Under 
the circumstances of this case, the court held that dissolution was not 
appropriate. 207 
J. Imprescriptible Mineral Servitudes 
In Yates v. Marston,208 Ruby and Son Hui Yates (the "Yates") pur­
chased land in Red River Parish in 1997 that was subject to two min­
eral servitudes. One of the servitudes, which was for one-half of any 
minerals produced from the property, was created in 1995 and was 
owned by Marston.209 Young reserved the second servitude, which 
was for one-fourth of any minerals produced from the property, when 
he sold the property to the Yates in 1997.210 
In 2002, the Yates sold the land to the Nature Conservancy. The 
deed transferring the land stated that the Yates "hereby expressly re­
serve unto themselves . . .  all of the subsurface oil, gas and liquid hy­
drocarbons in, on, or under the property . . .  and reversionary rights 
related thereto."21 1 The immediate effect of this reservation was to 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 622. 
202. Id. at 618. 
203. Id. at 619. 




208. Yates v. Morrison, 48,009 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/13); 121 So. 3d 673. 
209. Id. at 674. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
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create a mineral servitude in favor of the Yates for one-fourth of all 
minerals.2 12  The reservation could not immediately grant any greater 
servitude rights in favor of the Yates because of the outstanding servi­
tudes in favor of Marston and Young for three-fourths of the miner­
als.2 1 J It is noteworthy for the dispute that later arose, however, that 
the Yates purported to reserve all of the mineral and reversionary 
rights.214 
The Nature Conservancy sold the land to the United States in Au­
gust 2003.2 1 5  In March 2008, more than ten years after the creation of 
the servitudes held by Marston and Young, the Yates granted a min­
eral lease to Petrohawk Properties, LP ("Petrohawk"), which began 
drilling later that year, several Haynesville Shale wells for units that 
included the property.216 Petrohawk's drilling apparently was the first 
mineral activity relating to the property in  more than ten years. Pe­
trohawk began producing natural gas from those wells and paid all 
royalties attributable to the property to the Yates.217 
A dispute arose between the Yates, Marston, and Young regarding 
entitlement to royalties.218 Marston and Young argued that their servi­
tudes still were in effect and that they therefore were entitled to a 
share of proceeds from the production of Petrohawk's wells.2 19  The 
Yates argued that the Marston and Young servitudes had terminated 
by prescription of nonuse, making the Yates the owners of all the min­
eral rights relating to the property.220 Both sides relied on Mineral 
Code provisions relating to imprescriptible mineral servitudes, includ­
ing Mineral Code Article 149.l, which was in effect at the time of 
Yates' sale to the Nature Conservancy, though the article has been 
repealed and replaced since then.221 The former article stated: 
When land is acquired from any person by (a] . . .  nonprofit land 
conservation organization by conventional deed, donation, or other 
contract and by the act of acquisition, a mineral right otherwise sub­
ject to the prescription of nonuse is reserved, the grescription of 
nonuse shall not run against the mineral right . . . . 2 
The Second Circuit noted that the statute referred to "mineral 
right" twice; the first time referred to "a mineral right," and the sec­
ond time referred to "the mineral right. "22� The court acknowledged 
212. Id. 
213.  Id. at 679. 
214. Id. 
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that the phrase "the mineral right (definite article) appears to relate to 
the first, a mineral right (indefinite article)" and indeed that would 
seem to comport with the typical use of language.224 Notwithstanding 
the statute's apparent meaning, the majority concluded that the 
phrase "the mineral right" did "not necessarily" apply only to "a min­
eral right. "225 Accordingly, the court stated that the statute's provision 
that prescription would not run against "the mineral right" was not 
necessarily limited to "a mineral right" created in the transfer of land 
to a nonprofit land conservation organization.226 Instead, the major­
ity's opinion was that the statute was ambiguous.227 The court's expla­
nation that the statue was ambiguous is not entirely convincing, but 
having reached that conclusion, the court had to decide how to inter­
pret the supposedly ambiguous statute. 
The court then said that it would interpret the statute in the manner 
that "best conforms to the purpose of the law."228 The majority ulti­
mately concluded that, under old article 149.1, the pre-existing servi­
tudes held by Marston and Young were rendered imprescriptible by 
the Yates' sale of land to the Nature Conservancy.229 
The court also addressed another issue. After the Yates sold the 
land to the Nature Conservancy, but before the Nature Conservancy 
re-sold the land to the Federal Government, the legislature repealed 
Article 149.1 and replaced it with a new article 149.230 The new article 
149 contained provisions with language very similar to the language in 
old Article 149.1 that allowed for the creation of imprescriptible servi­
tudes. But the new article 149 also contained a new section that al­
lowed a landowner to retain a reversionary interest with respect to 
outstanding mineral rights.231 That new section explicitly states that 
the pre-existing servitude would still be subject to prescription.232 The 
Yates argued that the new article should be given retroactive effect 
and that the article would both validate their purported reservation of 
a reversionary interest and make clear that prescription still ran on the 
pre-existing servitudes. The majority concluded, however, that this 
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K. /nterprt'ltltimz of Overriding Royalty Deed 's "Calculate and Pay " 
Clau.ff in Relation to the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act 
In Total t:& P USA . Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas, t he parties dis­
puted the proper interpretation of an overriding royalty deed and 
whether the lessee 's obligation to pay overriding royal t ies was af­
fected by the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act ( " DWRRA").235 
The United States adopted D WR RA in 1 995 to encourage d ril ling 
in deep waters on t he outer continental shelf.:?30 DWRRA authorized 
the Department of Interior to suspend collection of certain royalties 
that ot herwise would be owed under federal offshore leases for the 
prod uction of oil and gas in deep water between 1 996 and 2000.237 The 
suspension would apply until a certain threshold amount of p roduc­
tion was obtaincd.2.lx 
In 1 998. the Federal Government issued an offshore lease to Mari­
ner Energy and Westport Oil and Gas. 2.w Westport assigned overrid­
ing royalty interests ("ORRis") to several persons.240 The assignments 
contained a "calculate and pay" clause t hat stated: "The overriding 
royalty interest assigned herein shall be calculated and paid in the 
same manner and subject to the same terms and conditions as the 
landowner's royal ty under the Lease. "24 1 Westport and Mariner later 
assigned their interests to Chevron, Total E & P ("Total"),  and 
Statoi l .  242 
In 2009, the new owners of the lease established production.24-� Be­
cause the production qualified for a royalty suspension,  the owners 
did not pay royalties to the Federal Government, but Chevron began 
making payme nts to the ORRis owners and continued to do so.244 I n  
contrast, Total  a n d  Statoil took t h e  posi tion that, for purposes o f  the 
"calculate and pay" clause. the royalty suspension was one of the 
"terms and conditions" of their obligation to make royalty payments 
to the "landowner. "24'.'I Accordingly. they argued their obliga tion to 
make ORRls payments was also suspended. The ORRis owners dis­
agreed and l it igation ensued.246 
The district court granted summary j udgment for Statoil and Total.  
but the U nited States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.  con-
2.15. Total E& P l /SA. Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & ( ias Corp . . 7 1 9  F.3d 424 ( 5 t h  Cir. 
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eluding that the "calculate and pay" clause was ambiguous.247 The 
Fifth Circuit stated that the clause could be interpreted as incorporat­
ing the federal regulations that define how royalties are calculated, 
without interpreting the clause as also incorporating DWRRA's sus­
pension of royalty payment obligations.248 Because of the ambiguity, 
the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.249 
II. LEGISLATION: GRANT OF EXPLICIT AUTHORITY AND 
DIRECTIVE TO REGULATE SOLUTION MINING 
In 2013, Act No. 368 amended Louisiana Revised Statute 30:3 to 
add definitions of "solution mined cavern" and "solution mining injec­
tion well." Act No. 368 also amended Louisiana Revised Statute 30:4 
to direct that the Office of Conservation must promulgate rules to 
regulate solution mining. 
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